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An important result in asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs is that non-rational traders, such as technical analysts extrapolating past price trends, may survive evolutionary competition. These results contradict the hypothesis that irrational traders will be driven out of the market by rational arbitrageurs, who trade against them and earn higher profits and accumulate higher wealth (Friedman, 1953) . In most asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs, irrational chartists can survive because evolutionary selection is driven by short run profitability. The role of memory, time horizons or long run profitability in the evolutionary fitness measure underlying strategy selection has hardly been studied in the literature however. LeBaron (2001 LeBaron ( , 2002 are among the few papers that have addressed the role of investor's time horizon in learning and strategy selection in an agent-based financial market. It has been argued that investors' time horizon is related to whether they believe that the world is stationary or non-stationary. In a stationary world agents should use all available information in learning and strategy selection, while if one views the world as constantly in a state of change, then it will be better to use a shorter history of past observations. One of LeBaron's main findings is that in a world where more agents have a long-memory horizon the volatility of asset price fluctuations is smaller. Stated differently, long-horizon investors make the market more stable, while short-horizon investors contribute to excess volatility and prevent asset prices to converge to the rational, fundamental benchmark.
Another contribution along these lines is Brock and Hommes (1999) , who use a simple, tractable asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs to investigate the effect of memory in the fitness measure for strategy selection. In contrast to LeBaron (2001 LeBaron ( , 2002 The outline of the paper is as follows. In Chapter 2 an adaptive belief system is presented in its general form with H different trader types. In Chapter 3 an ABS with two types and costs for information gathering is examined. In Chapter 4 we investigate the stability of the fundamental steady state in a more generalized framework without information costs. In Chapter 5 our theoretical findings with respect to memory are examined numerically in an example with three strategies.
The final section concludes and proofs are collected in an appendix.
An adaptive belief system is a standard discounted value asset pricing model derived from mean-variance maximization with heterogeneous beliefs about future asset prices. We shall briefly recall the model as in Brock and Hommes (1998) ; for a recent more detailed discussion see e.g. Hommes and Wagener (2009).
The asset pricing model
Agents can either invest in a risk free asset or in a risky asset. The risk free asset is in infinite elastic supply and pays a fixed rate of return r; the risky asset is in fixed supply z s and pays uncertain dividend. Let p t be the price per share of the risky asset at time t, y t the stochastic dividend process of the risky asset and z t be the number of shares of risky assets purchased at date t. Then wealth dynamics is given by
There are H different types of trading strategies. Let E ht and V ht denote forecasts of trader type h, with h = 1, ..., H, about conditional expectation and conditional variance, which is based on a publicly available information set of past prices and past dividends. Demand z h,t of a trader of type h for the risky asset is derived from myopic mean-variance maximization, i.e.
where a is the risk aversion parameter. Then the demand z h,t is given by
Let z s denote the supply of outside risky shares per investor, assumed to be constant, and let n h,t denote the fraction of type h at date t. Then equality of the demand and the supply in the market equilibrium implies
We shall assume the conditional variance V h,t = σ 2 to be constant and equal for all types 2 , thus the equilibrium pricing equation is given by
As in Brock and Hommes (1998) we focus on the case of zero outside supply,
i.e. z s = 0. It is well known that, if all agents are rational, the asset price is given by the discounted sum of expected future dividends
The price p * t is called the fundamental price. The properties of p * t depend upon the stochastic dividend process y t . We focus on the case of IID dividend process y t with constant meanȳ, for which the fundamental price is constant and given by
It will be convenient to work with the deviation from the fundamental price
Beliefs of type h satisfy the following assumptions 
The function f h represents agent type h's view of the world.
Brock and Hommes (1998) investigated evolutionary competition between simple linear forecasting rules with only one lag
where g h is the trend and b h is the bias of trader type h. If b h = 0 we call an agent h a pure trend chaser if g h > 0 and a contrarian if g h < 0. In the special case g h = 0 and b h = 0 trader of type h is a fundamentalist, believing that price returns to its fundamental value. 
Evolutionary fitness with memory
The evolutionary part of the model describes how beliefs are updated, i.e. how the fractions n h,t of trader types in the market evolve over time. Fractions are updated according to an evolutionary fitness measure U h,t . The fractions of agents choosing strategy h are given by the multi-nomial logit probabilities
The intensity of choice parameter β ≥ 0 measures how sensitive the traders are to selecting the optimal prediction strategy. The extreme case β = 0 corresponds to the case where agents do not switch and all fractions are fixed and equal 1/H. The other extreme case β = ∞ corresponds to the case where all traders immediately switch to the optimal strategy. An increase in the intensity of choice β represents an increase in the degree of rationality with respect to evolutionary selection of trading strategies. One of the main results of Brock and Hommes (1998) is that a rational route to randomness occurs, that is, as the intensity of choice increases the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and a bifurcation route to complicated, chaotic asset price fluctuations arises. The key question to be addressed in this paper is whether more memory is stabilizing or destabilizing. In particular, we are interested in the question of how memory in the fitness measure affects the primary bifurcation towards instability and how it affects the rational route to randomness.
A natural candidate for evolutionary fitness is a weighted average of current realized profits π ht and last period fitness U h,t−1 (2005)). We will refer to the case γ = 1 as cumulative weights and to the case γ = 1 − w as normalized weights 5 .
Notice that the two different cases lead to the same distribution of the relative weights over past profits, given by (1, w, w 2 , w 3 , · · · ). Stated differently, the relative contribution of past profits to overall fitness is the same for both weighting schemes.
For both weighting schemes, an increase of w thus means an increase of memory in the sense that more weight is given to more distant observations. However, an increase of w has another, second effect which is different for the two weighting schemes. As stated above, for γ = 1 all weights add up to 1/(1 − w), while for γ = 1 − w the weights are normalized to 1. This implies a scaling effect for γ = 1, with the sum of the weights, 1/(1 − w), blowing up to infinity as w approaches 1. In particular, for γ = 1 the fitness at steady state is multiplied by a factor 1/(1 − w). Hence, for the stability of a steady state, this scaling effect for γ = 1 is equivalent to an increase of the intensity of choice β by a factor 1/(1 − w). Because an increase of the intensity of choice may be destabilizing Hommes, 1997, 1998 ) the scaling effect for γ = 1 may be a destabilizing force as w increases, not present in the case of normalized weights. Another, related way of looking at this is to consider the direct effect of current realized profits on fitness. In the case of normalized weights, γ = 1 − w, the direct effect of current realized profits π ht (getting weight 1 − w) on fitness vanishes, i.e. tends to 0, as w tends to 1. On the other hand, in the case of cumulative weights, γ = 1, the direct effect of current realized profits π ht (always getting weight 1) on fitness stays the same, and thus remains non-negligible, independent of w. As we will see, these differences will lead to different stability results for evolutionary selection 6 .
Fitness (2.12) can be rewritten in deviations from the fundamental as
intrinsic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The Adaptive Belief System (ABS) with linear forecasting rules, in deviations from the fundamental, is given 16) where an additional noise term ε t , e.g. representing a small fraction of noise traders, has been added to the pricing equation and will be used in some stochastic simulations below. A special case, the deterministic skeleton, arises when all noise terms are set to zero. In order to understand the properties of the general stochastic model it is important to understand the properties of the deterministic skeleton.
Two types of agents and information costs
Consider an Adaptive Belief System (ABS) with two types of traders and the following forecasting rules
Type 1 believes in mean reversion, that the price will converge to its fundamental value. In the special case g 1 = 0, type 1 becomes a pure fundamentalists, as in Brock and Hommes (1998) . In contrast, type 2 believes that price deviations from the fundamental are persistent and will increase 7 . The dynamics in deviations from the fundamental is described by the following system
3)
where C 2 = 0, but C 1 = C > 0 is the information gathering costs for fundamentalists that agents of type 1 must pay per period. These costs reflect the effort investors incur to collect information about economic fundamentals.
We can rewrite the system above as a five-dimensional map
The following theorem describes the results concerning existence and stability of the steady states (see Appendix A for the proof).
Theorem 3.1. (Existence and stability of the steady states) Let us denote the fundamental steady state as x f = 0, and non-fundamental steady states as
, where
Then three cases are possible:
(i) 1 < g 2 < R: the fundamental steady state x f is the unique steady state and it is globally stable;
(ii) R ≤ g 2 < 2R − g 1 , the system displays a pitchfork bifurcation at β = β * such that -for 0 < β < β * x f is unique and stable;
-for β > β * there are three steady states: x f , x + and x − ; the fundamental steady state x f is unstable;
(iii) g 2 ≥ 2R − g 1 : there are always three steady states: x f , x + and x − ; the fundamental steady state x f is unstable.
When the trend chasers extrapolate only weakly, i.e. 1 < g 2 < R, the funda- are not too sensitive to switch the prediction strategy, i.e. for β < β * . As the intensity of choice increases (β > β * ) most of the agents switch to use the cheap prediction rule, because if the price is in a small neighborhood of its fundamental value then due to information costs the first type of agents have lower profits and for large β a majority of agents switches to the trend extrapolating strategy.
It can be seen immediately from expressions (3.6) and (3.7) how memory affects the primary bifurcation of the system. In the case with normalized weights (γ = 1− w) memory does not affect the stability. However, in the case of cumulative weights (γ = 1) and positive information gathering costs for fundamentalists, memory does affect the stability and in fact it destabilizes the system, i.e. with more memory the primary bifurcation occurs earlier. This is due to a scaling effect when the parameter w increases, leading to a larger effective intensity of choice and thus to an earlier bifurcation of the fundamental steady state.
Simulation 2 type example
As a typical example consider an ABS with the following two prediction rules
Traders of the first type believe that the next period deviation of the price from the fundamental will be two times less than in the current period, whereas traders of the second type predict an increase in deviation of the price from fundamental.
It follows from Theorem 3.1 that the fundamental steady state x f = 0 is unique and stable for β ∈ (0, β * ), with β * (w) = 1.79(1 − w)/γ. When the parameter β passes the critical value β * , the fundamental steady state looses stability due to a pitchfork bifurcation and two new stable equilibria of the price dynamics appear.
Next consider the two different cases: cumulative versus normalized weights.
Cumulative weights (γ = 1). In the case with accumulated profits, i.e. when γ = 1, the pitchfork bifurcation curve is given by β * (w) = 1.79(1 − w), which is declining with respect to the memory parameter. It means that memory destabilizes the price dynamics: the larger w the earlier the primary bifurcation occurs. occurs. Notice that, with memory in the fitness measure, the temporary bubbles and crashes in the price series occur less frequently, but when they occur they last longer with much larger deviations from the fundamental benchmark.
Normalized weights (γ = 1−w). In the case with normalized weights, i.e. when γ = 1−w, the pitchfork bifurcation curve is given by β * (w) = 1.79. Hence, memory does not affect the stability of the fundamental steady state. 
and without information gathering costs, i.e. C i = 0 for all i=1,. . . ,H. The coevolution prices and beliefs is described by the following difference equation
The following theorem describes the results concerning existence and stability of the fundamental steady state (see Appendix B for the proof). Assume that 1. The average bias equals zero, i.e.,
2. There is at least one non-zero bias, i.e. V =
3. The mean trend is not too strong, i.e.
Then the fundamental price x f = 0 is a steady state of (4.5). The fundamental steady state is stable for 0 ≤ β < β N S , where
At the value β = β N S the steady state loses stability due to a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. For β > β N S the fundamental steady state is unstable 8 .
The assumptions that the average bias is zero seems reasonable, as there is no a priori reason why the average bias would be negative or positive 9 . The other two assumptions, that there is at least one non-zero bias and that the average trend over all rules is not too strong, also seem plausible. The theorem says that, under these assumptions, the dynamic behavior of the price of the risky asset is independent of the number of agent's strategies, but rather depends on the mean valueḡ of the trend extrapolating coefficients g h and the diversity or spread V of the biases Role of the parameter γ. In the case γ = 1, i.e. in the case of cumulative weights, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve (4.6) becomes a straight line
as illustrated in Figure 3 In the case with normalized weights, γ = 1 − w, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve (4.6) becomes a "hyperbola" for both positive and negative values ofḡ (see Figure 3 , right panel):
In the case of normalized weights, memory is always stabilizing (independent of the average extrapolation factorḡ). Notice that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcations values (4.7) and (4.8) only differ by a factor (1 − w) in the denominator of (4.8) representing the scaling effect when weights are not normalized. Comparing the left and right panels of Figure 3 , this scaling effect dominates when average trend extrapolationḡ > 0 and destabilizes the system when the memory parameter w increases in the case of cumulative weights (i.e. γ = 1).
Numerical simulation of a 3-type example
In this section we discuss a simple, but typical ABS with three types of traders in order to illustrate the differences in impact of the memory strength on the stability of the fundamental price in the two cases of cumulative weights (γ = 1) and normalized weights (γ = 1 − w).
Consider the ABS with the following three types of prediction rules The case γ = 1. In the case with cumulative weights, i.e. when γ = 1, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve is a declining straight line: As can be seen from Figure 5 
Conclusion
We investigated how memory affects the stability of evolutionary selection dynamics in a simple, analytically tractable asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs.
By complementing the stability analysis with local bifurcation theory, we were able to analyze the effects of adding different amounts of memory to the fitness measure on the stability of the fundamental steady state. Whether memory is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on three key factors: (1) whether we have a fitness measure with cumulative weights or normalized weights; (2) the ecology (i.e. the composition of the set) of forecasting rules, in particular the average strength of trend extrapolation and the spread in biased forecasts, and (3) whether or not costs for information gathering of economic fundamentals have to be incurred.
When there are costs for gathering fundamental information, more memory in the fitness measure does not stabilize the dynamics. In the case with normalized weights, due to the information gathering costs, memory has no effect on stability; in the case of cumulative weights, when there are information gathering costs for fundamentalists, more memory is destabilizing due to a scaling effect leading to a larger effective intensity of choice.
We have also studied the model with an arbitrary number of linear forecasting rules with one lag and no costs for information gathering. The stability depends critically on the ecology of forecasting rules. In particular, the system may become unstable more easily when the average trend parameter and or the variability of biased forecasts become larger. How memory affects the stability of the fundamental steady state depends again on whether we have cumulative weights or normalized weights. In the case of normalized weights, more memory is always stabilizing: with more memory the first bifurcation towards instability comes later.
In the case of cumulative weights the effect of memory on the stability depends on the direction of average trend extrapolation. If agents on average are contrarians, extrapolating negatively, more memory stabilizes the system; if on the other hand agents on average extrapolate positively, memory destabilizes the system. This is due to a dominating scaling effect on the fitness at steady state, when weights are cumulative, which destabilizes the system if average trend extrapolation is positive.
Our analysis yields a precise mathematical classification of the stability of evolutionary selection for cumulative versus normalized weights in the fitness measure within in a very simple modeling framework. Which of these two fitness measures is more relevant in reality is an empirical and behavioral question. Is individual choice, for example individual portfolio selection in financial markets, driven by cumulative fitness (e.g. accumulated wealth) or by normalized fitness (e.g. average realized returns)? In particular, how much weight do individuals put on the most recently observed fitness? Our theoretical results show that the more weight they put on the most recent observation, the more easily the system may destabilize. 
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
The steady states of the map (3.5) satisfy the following equation
It is easy to see that the fundamental steady state x f = 0 always exists. The other (non-fundamental) steady state is a solution of the equation
Note that if (R − g 1 )/(g 2 − R) ≤ 0 there are no solutions for this equation. If we take into account that g 1 < 1 then we can conclude that for 1 < g 2 < R the map (3.2)-(3.4) is contracting and has a unique globally stable steady state x f = 0.
Assume now that g 2 > R, then we can obtain non-fundamental steady states from the equation
which has solutions x = ±x * , when its right hand side is positive. It is satisfied for β > β * in (3.7) if R ≤ g 2 < 2R − g 1 , and for any positive β if g 2 ≥ 2R − g 1 . This
proves the statements about existence of equilibria in (i), (ii) and (iii).
In order to explore the stability of the fundamental steady state we need to compute eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
The characteristic equation is given by
and thus
Note that all eigenvalues are real and non-negative, so the only bifurcation that may occur is a pitchfork bifurcation, which happens if
This means that if g 2 ∈ [R, 2R − g 1 ) for β ∈ (0, β * ) there exists a unique stable fundamental steady state, and at the critical parameter value β = β * two nonfundamental steady states occur due to a pitchfork bifurcation.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
Note that at the fundamental steady state all fitnesses are equal to zero, i.e. U * h = 0 for h = 1, .., H, which implies that all fraction are equal, n * h = 1/H. Therefore the steady state price satisfies the following equation If p(λ) has at least one root outside of the unit circle, the steady state is unstable.
We denote roots of p(λ) as λ 1 and λ 2 .
Let us now explore three cases when one or two roots of p(λ) are crossing a unit circle:
1. λ 1 = 1, pitchfork bifurcation, 
To make sure that µ which is satisfied for |ḡ| < R and any value of w ∈ [0, 1).
Our analysis shows that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is the only bifurcation that occurs in the system. It happens for β = β N S as in (B.6) and leads to a loss of stability of the fundamental steady state.
